INFORMATION SUPPLEMENT
ICS WATER TREATMENT PLANT BUILDING

In April of 1999 the various contracts involved in the construction of the plant were advertised to both the local and the regional construction community. For several of the trade disciplines it was difficult to find qualified contractors interested in bidding on the work. As an example, one of the most crucial was the concrete contractor. This activity was actually bid four times before a vendor was selected, and then the contracted price was substantially higher then the "engineer's estimate". The Bloomington construction market in 1999 was a "contractor's market." Consequently there were no opportunities for cost savings.

No vendors submitted bids on the erection of the treatment plant building. The company that eventually took the job was contacted directly by the ERS Project Manager and an agreement was reached. The vendor, although admitting they had never erected the particular type of building that had been purchased, convinced EPA's prime contractor, Earth Tech, that they could preform the work.

When the building was about 75% completed, Earth Tech was notified by subcontractors that the various subcontractors of the prime building erection contractor were not getting paid. This coincided with the Construction Manager noticing abnormalities-with some of the bracing and with the metal on the roof "kinking". These spurred an in-depth review of the completed construction as compared with the engineering drawings. This in turn led to a stop work order issued to the erection contractor, and a chance to correct his work. When this was not done in the manner outlined in the contract, another contractor was hired for the purpose of making the building safe to continue the mechanical and electrical tasks occurring inside the building.

Earth Tech has since hired another contractor to retro-fit the building with the correct parts purchased from the building supplier. The first contractor had installed some parts backwards, threw some parts away, and failed to install others. Using original parts will allow the building supplier to honor its warranty on the building. This work is complete and has cost the EPA's prime contractor over $200,000 to repair. This money (parts and labor) has NOT been charged to U.S. EPA. In fact, at the insistence of the FOSC (Federal On-Scene Coordinator) none of the other labor costs incurred by the prime contractor (Earth Tech) associated with the construction/vendor problems are being charged to the project.

The fate of the various subcontractors who were not paid by the building contractor is less certain. The building contractor signed "release of lien" forms when submitting its invoice to the prime contractor, thereby certifying it had paid its subcontractors. EPA's prime contractor has repaid at least a couple of the subcontractors, and hopefully will work out restitution with the remaining ones.

The question was asked why the prime contractor, Earth Tech and it's full time inspector did not notice the building contractors deficiencies before the building project was 75 % complete. The answer lies in the fact the Project Inspector's responsibilities ran the gamut of intermingled construction activities, not just the building erection. An error was certainly made by not noticing the problems with the building contractor. The problem should have been caught much earlier, but was not. Rather then assigning blame, the FOSC worked with the prime contractor to resolve the problem. To date, the FOSC is satisfied with the resolution of the problem with the building. U.S. EPA's prime contractor has performed admirably in the aftermath of the original contractor's failure to perform and his subsequent financial problems. Aside from some embarrassment and some inconvenience, no added EPA funds were directly used to correct the problem.

STORAGE TANKS

The purpose of the tanks is an important one. The tanks are designed to store an additional 5,000 g.p.m. of spring flow, until such a time as the peak of the storm passes and the flow to the plant drops under its 1,000 capacity. Then, the contaminated water stored in the tanks can be treated. The tanks also act as a passive clarifier, dropping out a certain amount of sediment from storm water, before it is pumped to the plant. Refer to Attachment V for a history of the various storm events since the plant was placed on-line, the amounts treated, and the amount by-passed.

Construction of the tanks began in the fall of 1999. and continued through the 1999-2000 winter. Prior to filling the tanks with over 650,000 gallons of water for leak detection purposes, the Construction Manager noticed engineering problems regarding structural support of large diameter piping. The engineering and design of the bolted tanks was the designated responsibility of the tank company. The tank company was awarded the contract, because it had the lowest bid and is a large, nationally known company. The FOSC was involved in many conversations and correspondence over the structural concerns noted by both the Construction Manager and the FOSC. It was obvious to both Earth Tech and the FOSC that the structure was flawed and that other problems would likely occur if the tanks were brought into service. These other problems manifested themselves in the many leaks that occurred in the sides and bottoms when the tanks were filled. Further, a structural "bulge" was very noticeable along the lowermost plate or "chime" of the tanks.

In September of 2000, the tank company tried to resolve the structural problems by tightening bolts and hiring sealing companies to coat the seams with an industrial sealer. All of these efforts were unsuccessful. The FOSC informed Earth Tech's Construction Manger that the tanks would not be accepted, regardless of whether the leaks were stopped, without a letter from either the tank company or from Earth Tech stating that if the tanks developed a leak in a one year period, they would be replaced without question. However, the tank company would not agree to this condition. Earth Tech was aware of the FOSC's intent, but internally agreed to allow the tank company one last attempt to stop the leaks.

As of this date, Earth Tech is in the final stages of evaluating bids for the demolition of the tanks and the engineering and construction of new tanks. It is hoped that the new tanks can be brought into service by the original date the project was to be turned over to the IDEM, that being May 1, 2001. Whether this is possible or not is yet to be determined, hence the additional six months of operational costs that are requested.

As of this date, the ERS Contractor has not asked EPA to pay for any of the costs associated with the demolition of the old tanks and the construction of the new tanks. Whether or not the ERS contractor in some point in the future decides to bill EPA for this work, depends on the interpretation of their contract with EPA and their ability to cost recover against the original tank company.

The tank contract was bid like all the other contracts were, but in this case there were several qualified bidders and the low bid was selected. The winning company is nationally known. In addition to providing the tanks, they were also charged with performing the engineering and design that would be necessary to support the application that the site required. The design was flawed and EPA's prime contractor is now prepared to take them to task for their failure to perform.

The decision to not accept the tanks, in spite of what others might say are minor leaks, was solely the decision of the FOSC. To have accepted less than what was paid for and, therefore, using the tanks to capture PCB-contaminated water and PCB-contaminated sediment during storm events, would have made it impossible to attempt to fix the leaks without serious decontamination efforts after every use. In addition, any attempt to give the plant to IDEM with this problem would have threatened the very project itself, because IDEM did not want the plant with the leaky tanks.

Consequently, in having to choose between accepting leaky tanks and risking IDEM not taking over the O&M of the plant in May of 2001, versus allowing an undetermined amount of contaminated water and sediment to by-pass the plant, the FOSC chose the above course of action.