UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
SARAH ELIZABETH FREY et al,
Plainiff,
vs.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, et al., Defendants.
May 3, 2003
PLAINTIFFS' SURREPLY MEMORANDUM IN
RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
The federal defendant filed a Reply memorandum on April 16, 2003;
however, it was not served upon Plaintiffs' counsel until April 25, 2003. This
surreply memorandum is filed within seven (7) days of service of the federal
defendants' Reply.
In their Reply memorandum, Defendants raise a new argument or articulate
their original argument for the first time in a way that it can be perceived for what it
actually is. Defendants in their Reply argue that:
1 ) Plaintiffs' Complaint challenges in-progress information gathering by EPA
via ViaCom. Defendants imply this without citing to any part of the Complaint;
2) This in-progress information gathering equates to a"removal action" as
that term is defined under CERCLA;
3) EPA intends to take some yet to be defined action in the future based on
the yet to be completed information gathering;
4) This future EPA action is not speculative because EPA is already sure
some type of future action is required because significant releases of toxic PCBs
continue to be discharged uncontrolled from the three Bloomington Superfund sites
in question into the environment1;
5) The anticipated fixture EPA action will be a remedial action as that term is
defined under CERCLA;
6) Such anticipated future undefined yet to be selected remedial action falls
within the scope of the timing of judicial review limitations of CERCLA section
1 1 3(h) as does the on-going information gathering and the two actions together
represent a removal action where a remedial action is to follow;
7) CERCLA prohibits challenges to removal actions where a remedial action
is to follow.
The errors in this new or newly articulated Defendants' argument are:
a) Nowhere in Plaintiffs' Complaint is there a challenge to EPA's (or
ViaCom's) on-going information gathering activities;
b) Plaintiffs in the Complaint challenge only the past remedial actions already
selected by EPA in RODS and completed on the three sites;
c) Defendants in their Reply admit that there are no remedial actions specified
in these past RODs for the three sites that have not yet been completed;
d) Defendants in their Reply admit that significant releases of PCBS to the
environment continue to occur from these three sites;
e) Defendants admit that any future remedial action that may follow the
current information gathering activities is not currently selected under CERCLA
section l 04 or secured under CERCLA section 106 (and could not be because such
remedial action has yet to be defined);
i) Viacom maintains the position that after the information is gathered that no
additional remedial may be required at all;
g) CERCLA section 113(h)'s plain language states, as Defendants recognize
and quote, that "no federal court shall have jurisdiction to review any challenge
to a removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review
any order issued under section 9606(a) of this title" except in certain specified
exceptions. 42 U.S.C. sec. 9613(h). The citizen suit exception of this same
provision provides an exception to this already narrow bar for:
an action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizen suits)
alleging that the removal or remedial action taken under section 9604
of this title or secured under section 9606 of this title was in violation
of any requirement of this chapter. Such an action may not be brought
with regard to a removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at
the site.
42 U.S.C. sec. 9613(h)(4). It is clear from this plain language that section 9613(h)
(and all of its exceptions) does not prevent judicial review of an action that was
selected under 9604 or secured via a section 9606 order and then completed, as here
but clearly provides for such review. While review of a removal action selected or
secured under CERCLA sections 9604 or 9606 is prohibited where a remedial
action is to follow, there is no prohibition on the reverse, review of a completed
remedial action when subsequent information gathering or removal actions are
determined to be needed because the remedial action failed to remedy the problem
(and those subsequent actions are not specified in the original remedial action, i.e. in
the original ROD). The Defendants' argument is contrary to the plain language of
the statute.
h) The Schalk and Cooper Industries cases cited by Defendants are inapposite
and do not stand for the proposition that a completed remedial action cannot be
challenged in a citizen suit (as Plaintiffs do here), but stand for an inapplicable rule
that a yet to be completed action cannot be challenged on the grounds of illegal
procedure (Schalk), Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990), and cannot be
challenged at any stage before completion including the earliest stage before
approval of the ROD, Cooper Industries. Inc. v. EPA, 775 F. Supp. 1027
(W.D.Mich. 1991). Here the RODs are final and all remedial actions specified in
the RODs are completed. Cooper Industries is, of course, non-binding authority
even if read to be applicable.
i) Defendants engage in baseless exaggerated rhetoric when they assert that
Plaintiffs' position is illogical, contrary to caselaw and "would open a massive
loophole in the well-established interpretation of section 113(h)." It is Defendants
whose position is contrary to the plain language of the statute. There is no caselaw
to support Defendants' position and there is a reason why. Congress intended the
protection from judicial review to apply to agency actions selected by the proper
statutory procedure that Congress specified in sections 9604 and 9606. Congress
did not contemplate EPA making sweetheart deals with polluters such as ViaCom
where some portion of a remedy would not be included in the selected remedy in the
ROD even though EPA believed it necessary to protect the public simply because
the polluter refused to pay for it. Here EPA wants to have their cake and eat it too,
EPA wants the protections of section 9613(h) without following the procedures in
the statute required to obtain that protection. In so doing, EPA asks the District
Court to take Congress' role and re-write the statute. This, of course, is not the
proper role of the courts.
EPA and Viacom freely acknowledge that the Source Control Operable Unit
excavations of the PCB Superfund NPL Sites were complete. What they failed to mention in their
Reply Memorandums on EPA's Motion for Summary Judgment was that the excavations at all
three sites had failed to accomplish their objectives, which in the Lemon Lane Landfill Record
of Decision (ROD) were stated to be:
Reduce or eliminate the direct contact threat associated with contaminated landfill
material.
Minimize contaminant migration within the karst topography and to Groundwater
and surface waters to levels that ensure the beneficial reuse of these resources.
Minimize future migration of Groundwater contamination to surface water.
The Source Control Operable Unit did not eliminate, reduce, or minimize migration of
PCBs in the remedial actions performed at the Superfund Sites to Groundwater and the
environment. As stated in the EPA March 16, 2000 News Release to the Herald -Times the
release of PCBs into the environment continued at the high levels of previous releases at these
sites, before the so-called "cleanups".
This was no surprise for none of the Hotspot Cleanups were based on even a semblance of
an adequate study and this harks back to the fact that EPA denied Monroe County/
City of Bloomington citizens requests for Remedial Investigations/ Feasibility Studies on any of
the Superfund Sites, simply because Westinghouse, CBS and Viacom the PRPs did not want
them. For EPA to say functional equivalents were made is also fatuous for the history of these
sites show how inadequate and unacceptable were the studies but also the amount required to be
excavated.
Beyond the fact that the studies were inadequate is the fact that the excavations were
minimal and CBS, the principal responsible party ("PRP") at the time refused to agree to more.
Another fact is just as meaningful for EPA required no removal at Neal's Landfill below 500 ppm
making a sham of cleanup of that 18 acre landfill.
Bennett's Dump seems a special case for the site was dotted with quarries from one end
to the other that were covered over once filled and EPA's choice for excavation was probably
only part of the contamination.
The most significant part of a cleanup is Source Control and in the Monroe County
Superfund NPL Sites the PCBs were concentrated in landfills and it should be recognized by
EPA now, as they did back in 1984-85 when the Consent Decree was being developed and they
were following their scientific consultants advice, that if you are going to cleanup the
Groundwater and the environment that the most significant action to take is cleanup of the PCB-
containing landfills to the extent possible, as the first step. Plaintiffs are concerned that EPA is
trying to walk away from Source Control at the Source---- which failed for obvious reasons, and
go on to water treatment and PCB sedimentation cleanups, the 2nd and 3r~ Operable units.
EPA states on page 8 of its Reply Memorandum that the work completed to date was
never intended to stand on its own as a remedy. Plaintiffs opposed the "hotspot cleanups" as
obviously inadequate for Source Control so obviously agree, but the fact that it failed should
motivate renewed effort to remove the remaining PCB -contaminated soils and other PCB
contaminated materials. Although they objected to the proposed "hot spot" excavation, Plaintiffs
were constrained by the timing of judicial review provisions of CERCLA to wait until EPA
completed its source control remedial action. The "hot spot" excavation was an utter and
undeniable failure. It is now time for the source control remedial action to face judicial scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated herein and in Plaintiffs' initial Response to
Defendants' Motion, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Rudolph Wm. Savich
One of Counsel for Plaintiffs
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